THE CONCEPT OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: A THEORETICAL-LEGAL ANALYSIS

Abstract

The article presents a comprehensive theoretical-legal analysis of the right to a fair trial, distinguished by its multifaceted methodological approach that combines philosophical, jurisprudential, and constitutional-legal methods of analysis.

The work begins with an in-depth examination of justice as a philosophical category, tracing it from classical Greek thought (Plato, Aristotle) to contemporary theories (Rawls, Dworkin, Nozick). The author distinguishes and analyzes different types of justice—distributive, corrective, retributive, restorative, and procedural—demonstrating their interconnection with legal justice.

Special attention is paid to the relationship between equity and legal justice, the principle of the rule of law, and human dignity as the philosophical foundation of a fair trial. The fundamental theories of law are examined—natural law, legal positivism, and the interpretive approach—and their influence on the formation of the concept of a fair trial.

The article substantiates the dual nature of the right to a fair trial as both a subjective right and an objective constitutional mandate. The adversarial and inquisitorial procedural models are analyzed, along with the role of the judicial process as public discourse and a source of state legitimacy.

Through critical and integrative considerations, it is demonstrated that the right to a fair trial is not limited to procedural technical rules, but rather reflects a synthesis of centuries-old philosophical and legal thought on justice, the rule of law, and human dignity.

The novelty of the study lies in its comprehensive analysis of the concept of a fair trial as a product of the historical development of legal philosophy.